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ARTICLES
A PYRRHIC PRESS VICTORY: WHY HOLDING
RICHARD JEWELL IS A PUBLIC FIGURE IS
WRONG AND HARMS JOURNALISM
Clay Calvert* and Robert D. Richards**
I. INTRODUCTION
When a Georgia appellate court in October 2001 declared Richard
Jewell, the private security guard first suspected' but later cleared of
committing the bombing in Atlanta's Centennial Olympic Park in 1996,2 to
be a public figure in his libel 3 case against the Atlanta Journal-
* Associate Professor of Communications & Law and Co-Director of the Pennsylvania
Center for the First Amendment at The Pennsylvania State University; B.A., 1987,
Communication, Stanford University; J.D. (Order of the Coif), 1991, McGeorge School of Law,
University of the Pacific; Ph.D., 1996, Communication, Stanford University; Member, State Bar
of California.
** Professor of Journalism & Law and Founding Co-Director of the Pennsylvania Center
for the First Amendment at The Pennsylvania State University; B.A., 1983, M.A. 1984,
Communications, The Pennsylvania State University; J.D., 1987, The American University;
Member, State Bar of Pennsylvania.
1. See generally Kevin Sack, He Felt Much 'Like a Hunted Animal,' N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29,
1996, at A 12 (describing "the most circumstantial of evidence" upon which the Federal Bureau of
Investigation based its focus on Jewell as a suspect).
2. See generally Eric Harrison, Security Guard Cleared in Olympic Bomb Case, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 27, 1996, at Al, A20 (describing both the stakeout by the FBI of "Jewell's every
move" after the bombing and the letter later issued by the Justice Department that cleared him as
"a target of the federal criminal investigation into the bombing on July 27, 1996, at Centennial
Olympic Park"). The current suspect in the bombing is Eric Rudolph, who was "last seen running
into the hills of North Carolina." Clarence Page, Rumsfeld Shows How Truth Is Our Most Potent
Weapon, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Oct. 30, 2001, at A44; see also Sue Anne Pressley, Carolinians
Doubt Rudolph Is Hiding in Their Mountains, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 1999, at A3 (describing the
search for Eric Robert Rudolph and observing that law enforcement authorities charged Rudolph
with the bombing of Centennial Olympic Park "after dropping security guard Richard Jewell as a
suspect").
3. Libel is defined generally under the applicable Georgia statute as "a false and malicious
defamation of another, expressed in print, writing, pictures, or signs, tending to injure the
reputation of the person and exposing him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule." GA. CODE
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Constitution,4  media attorneys and journalists rejoiced. 5  Editor &
Publisher, a leading journalism trade magazine that had previously mocked
Jewell in an editorial as a "well-fed former security guard,",6 lauded the
decision because it "likely killed any chance that Jewell [would] prevail in
his libel suit against the Atlanta Journal-Constitution.7  This time, the
magazine derided him for "drawling his tale like a backwoods version of
Joe Friday,",8 gloating that the opinion probably would end what it called
"Jewell's lucrative sideline of shaking down news organizations."
This Article argues that such celebration is shortsighted. Indeed, the
decision to hold Richard Jewell is a public figure9 and thereby force him to
prove actual malice'°0-a rigorous standard typically not faced by private
figures' '-may cause long-term harm to journalists seeking sources.
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary defines a "Pyrrhic
victory" as that which is "won at excessive cost."' 2  While the Atlanta
Journal-Constitution scored a victory in its battle with Richard Jewell, the
decision may cost journalists future sources 13 of information. Why step
ANN. § 51-5-1 (a) (Harrison 1998). Libel in a newspaper, in turn, is defined as "[a]ny false and
malicious defamation of another in any newspaper, magazine, or periodical, tending to injure the
reputation of the person and expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule ...." GA. CODE
ANN. § 51-5-2 (a) (Harrison 1998).
4. Atlanta Journal-Constitution v. Jewell, 555 S.E.2d 175 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001), cert. denied,
2002 Ga. LEXIS 104 (2002). The case was consolidated with Jewell v. Cox Enters., No.
A01A1565 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001), cert. denied, 2002 Ga. LEXIS 103 (2002). The appellate court
found that the "evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's determination that Jewell was a
voluntary limited-purpose public figure." Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 555 S.E.2d at 185.
5. See Richmond Eustis, Atlanta Newspaper Wins Big in Jewell Libel Rulings, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER (Phila.), Oct. 12, 2001, at 4 (stating David E. Hudson, general counsel for the
Georgia Press Association, called the decision "a great victory" for the Atlanta Journal-
Constitution).
6. Public Rights on Trial, EDITOR & PUBLISHER (N.Y.), May 22, 2000, at 18 [hereinafter
Public Rights on Trial].
7. Jewell Ruling Sparkles, EDITOR & PUBLISHER (N.Y.), Oct. 15, 2001, at 11 [hereinafter
Jewell Ruling Sparkles].
8. Id.
9. See generally Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974) (describing three
classes of public figure plaintiffs in libel law, including involuntary public figures, all-purpose
public figures, and voluntary limited-purpose public figures).
10. Actual malice is the publication of a statement "with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
279-280 (1964).
11. JOHN D. ZELEZNY, COMMUNICATIONS LAW: LIBERTIES, RESTRAINTS, AND THE
MODERN MEDIA 128 (3d ed. 2001). A majority of states that have addressed the issue have held
that private figure plaintiffs only need to prove negligence against the media, which is a lesser
degree of fault. Id.
12. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 961 (1983).
13. A source "in the journalistic and popular vernacular" may be defined as "a person who
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forward, after all, to tell the press what you know or what you saw about an
event of public concern? The very act of doing so could convert you from
a private figure into a public figure, and thereby make it much more
difficult to recover in a defamation case should the press turn on you and
allegedly defame you. 14  Parsed differently, the decision could cause a
chilling effect 15 on speech, making the select sources upon whom the press
is dependent for information reluctant to come forward with that
information. The public, in turn, pays the price and is harmed by the
reduced flow of information.
If one believes Jewell's side of the story, he did not even seek out the
media to tell his story; 16 the media sought him out. 17 In particular, Jewell
claims that news organizations initially contacted AT&T-the entity that
hired private security for Centennial Olympic Park-for interviews with
the security guard who first spotted the unattended package that contained
the bomb.' 8 According to documents filed in the case by Jewell's attorney
L. Lin Wood,19 it was the media relations coordinator for AT&T who
"arranged for Mr. Jewell to participate in a limited number of media
interviews,, 20 and for whom Jewell agreed to participate "to accommodate
the desires of AT&T.",21 This, of course, runs directly contrary to Editor &
Publisher's dig that Jewell "appeared on any media outlet that would have
provides information for ultimate dissemination by the press to the public." C. THOMAS DIENES
ET AL., NEWSGATHERING AND THE LAW § 13-4 (2d ed. 1999).
14. See generally Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
15. Cf. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965) (using the term "chilling effect" in
the context of the exercise of First Amendment free expression rights).
16. See generally Brief for Appellant at 4, Jewell v. Cox Enters., 555 S.E.2d 175 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2001) (No. A01A1565) [hereinafter Brief for Appellant].
17. See Felicity Barringer, Once Accused, Now the Accuser, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1999, at
CI0.
18. See Kevin Sack, Atlanta Papers Are Sued in Olympic Bombing Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
29, 1997, at A12.
19. Wood has been hailed as "an expert in resurrecting tarnished clients in the court of
public opinion." Stacy Finz et al., Condit's Bid to Answer Critics Called Disaster,' S.F.
CHRON., Aug. 25, 2001, at Al. In addition to Jewell, Wood represents John and Patsy Ramsey,
parents of the murdered JonBendt Ramsey. Id. Other counsel for Jewell in his case against the
Atlanta Journal-Constitution are Brandon Homsby, an attorney in Wood's firm (L. Lin Wood,
P.C.), and G. Watson Bryant, a solo practitioner from Atlanta. See Richard Jewell's Petition for
Cert. at 27, Jewell v. Cox Enters., 555 S.E.2d 175 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (No. S02C0194)
[hereinafter Petition for Cert.] (listing Wood, Hornsby and Bryant as Jewell's counsel in the
case). The Georgia Supreme Court recently declined to hear Jewell's latest appeal. Ga. High
Court Declines to Hear Appeal of Jewell Lawsuit, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 12 2001), at
http://www.msnbc.com/local/rtga/ml47865.asp.
20. Brief for Appellant, supra note 16, at 4.
21. Id.
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him .... ,22
The decision of the Georgia Court of Appeals may chill speech by
expanding the notion of the voluntary limited-purpose public figure to
include good-Samaritan sources like Jewell who agree to speak with the
media upon request. Moreover, the decision is dangerous because it
breathes new life into an even more rare and heretofore moribund category
of public figure-the involuntary public figure.23  In 1974, the United
States Supreme Court observed in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 24 that
"[h]ypothetically, it may be possible for someone to become a public figure
through no purposeful action of his own, but the instances of truly
involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare."25 This limiting and
cautionary admonition, however, did nothing to dissuade the Georgia
appellate court.26 It found "clear and convincing evidence '2 7 that Jewell's
case was, indeed, one of those exceedingly rare instances in which the
plaintiff was, "at the very least,, 28 an involuntary limited-purpose public
figure. 29 Earlier in the opinion, the court also held that there was sufficient
evidence to find that Jewell also was a voluntary limited-purpose public
figure.30 Either way, Jewell was a public figure.
This Article examines the long, strange trip of Richard Jewell from
private citizen and security guard to public figure and libel plaintiff. Part II
provides a factual overview of the case, 3' drawing from primary sources
including the appellate briefs filed by both Jewell and the Atlanta Journal-
Constitution, as well as trial court32 and appellate court decisions. Part III
provides a brief primer about the importance of sources in journalism,
especially as they relate to the free flow of information and the pressures
that sources sometimes feel to remain silent when approached by reporters
for comments. 33 Next, Part IV describes the public-figure doctrine in libel
22. Jewell Ruling Sparkles, supra note 7.
23. Aureliano Sanchez-Arango, The Elusive "Involuntary Limited Purpose Public Figure:"
Why the Fourth Circuit Got It Wrong in Wells v. Liddy, 9 GEO. MASON L. REv. 211, 221 (2000)
(stating that the involuntary public-figure category had been thought by some to be "a dead letter"
notion).
24. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
25. Id. at 345 (emphasis added).
26. See Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 555 S.E.2d at 186.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 185.
31. See discussion infra Part II.
32. Order, Jewell v. Cox Enters., 555 S.E.2d 175 (1999) (No. 97 VS 0122804) [hereinafter
Order] (on file with author).
33. See discussion infra Part III.
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law, including the various classifications of public figures articulated by
courts in the past and the criteria for determining whether a plaintiff fits
into one of those classifications.34 Part V then sets forth the parties'
arguments regarding whether Jewell should be a public figure, and analyzes
and critiques the appellate court's decision to affirm the trial court's ruling
that Richard Jewell was a limited-purpose public figure. 35 Finally, Part VI
concludes that journalistic jubilation over the decision to hold Jewell a
public figure-be it voluntary or involuntary-is misguided.36  In
particular, the decision punishes good Samaritan sources and, in the
process, threatens to stifle those sources and to chill the flow of information
to the public on pressing issues and concerns. When public safety is an
issue, as it was at the time of the bombing in Centennial Olympic Park in
199637 and as it is now after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,38
any chilling effect on speech that relates to safety and security must be
carefully scrutinized. In the Conclusion, the authors will call for judicial
adoption of a "Good Samaritan Source" rule that would allow individuals
like Richard Jewell to remain private figures when they are interviewed by
the media about events of public concern.
II. FROM OBSCURITY TO SCRUTINY TO INFAMY: THE TALE OF RICHARD
JEWELL AND THE ANATOMY OF A DEFAMATION CASE
This much is undisputed: on July 27, 1996, a bomb exploded in the
early morning hours at Centennial Olympic Park in downtown Atlanta,
Georgia. 39 It is also clear that a previously obscure and relatively unknown
man named Richard Jewell became the focus of media limelight when he
went from hero to suspect in the bombing. 40 His personal nightmare and
the "media frenzy' 4' surrounding it began when a 378-word story in the
Atlanta Journal-Constitution-a story that failed to cite a single named
source-ran on July 30, 1996 under the banner headline "FBI Suspects
34. See discussion infra Part IV.
35. See discussion infra Part V.
36. See discussion infra Part VI.
37. See Edith Stanley, Atlanta Park Bomb's Blast Still Echoes, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2000
at A5.
38. See generally Nancy Gibbs, If You Want to Humble an Empire, TIME, Sept. 11, 2001, at
32, 34 (describing the attacks involving hijacked planes on both the Twin Towers of the World
Trade Center in Manhattan and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., on September 11, 2001).
39. See Barringer, supra note 17 (stating that the "explosion in Centennial Olympic Park, at
1:20 A.M., Saturday, July 27, caused 2 deaths and injured 11l people").
40. See Kevin Sack, Report of a Hero-Turned-Suspect Rivets Attention in Atlanta, N.Y.
TIMES, July 31, 1996, at B6.
41. Alicia Shepard, Going to Extremes, AM. JOURNALISM REv., Oct. 1996, at 38, 40.
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'Hero' Guard May Have Planted Bomb. 42 Authored by the late Kathy
Scruggs 43 and Ron Martz, the story identified Jewell as "the focus of the
federal investigation" into the bombing and said that he "fits the profile of
the lone bomber. This profile generally includes a frustrated white man
who is a former police officer, member of the military, or police 'wannabe'
who seeks to become a hero." 44
After the publication of this article, Jewell-a white man who indeed
had been a police officer before the Olympics, and would become one
again afterwards45-became not just the focus of law enforcement, but the
media and much of the American public. 46 In brief, "Jewell's private life
was transformed into a public spectacle .... He was not happy, to say
the least, with the resulting coverage, and Jewell filed several defamation
suits in response. 48 This included a so-called "defamacast '' 49 suit filed by
Jewell against NBC, after Tom Brokaw remarked during a July 30, 1996
broadcast that law enforcement officials "probably have enough to arrest
[Jewell] right now, probably enough to prosecute him" 50 and stated that
42. Kathy Scruggs & Ron Martz, FBI Suspects 'Hero' Guard May Have Planted Bomb,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., July 30, 1996, at IX.
43. Scruggs, who died in September 2001, was the focus of intense scrutiny by Richard
Jewell and his attorney, L. Lin Wood, who sought her sources for the initial article that named
Jewell as a focus of the FBI's investigation. Trisha Renaud, Reporter Death Complicates Case,
FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Oct. 12, 2001, at 1.
44. Scruggs & Martz, supra note 42.
45. Prior to the 1996 Olympics in Atlanta, Jewell had worked for the Habersham County
Sheriff's office in Georgia and as a campus security officer at Piedmont College in northern
Georgia. Barringer, supra note 39; see also Kevin Johnson, Jewell Still Setting Sights on Police
Job, USA TODAY, Oct. 28, 1996, at 3A. More than one year after the Olympics, Jewell was hired
as a patrol officer in the small town of Luthersville, Georgia. Bill Montgomery, Jewell Lands Job
as Officer on Luthersville Police Force, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Nov. 26, 1997, at lB. Jewell
quit that job reportedly "because he was weary of the commute from his home 40 miles
away.. . ." Nation in Brief WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 1998, at A5. In 2000, Jewell was back in law
enforcement, working as a patrol officer in Jefferson, Georgia. Luke Cyphers, Still Seeking Bomb
Shelter, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Oct. 1, 2000, at 94, LEXIS, News, News Group File, All. Jefferson
is a town of 5,000 people located northeast of Atlanta. Id. Jewell was still employed in that job
as an officer in February, 2001. Olympics Bombing, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 2001, at W5.
46. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 45.
47. ROBERT D. RICHARDS, FREEDOM'S VOICE: THE PERILOUS PRESENT AND UNCERTAIN
FUTURE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 106 (1998).
48. See generally Atlanta Journal-Constitution v. Jewell, 555 S.E.2d 175 (Ga. Ct. App.
2001).
49. "Defamacast" refers to "[d]efamation via a radio or television broadcast .... Jaillett v.
Ga. Television Co., 520 S.E.2d 721, 724 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 51-5-1
(Harrison 1998) (setting forth the Georgia statute governing civil liability for defamatory
statements in visual or sound broadcasts).
50. L. Lin Wood, The Case of David v. Goliath: Jewell v. NBC and the Basics of
Defamacast in Georgia, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 673, 692 (1997).
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those officials "are only using one name tonight, and that is Richard
Jewell." 51  NBC quickly settled the case in December 1996 for an
undisclosed amount of money.52 One of Jewell's attorneys, L. Lin Wood,
stated that "Richard and his attorneys [were] satisfied with the
settlement ....
Unlike NBC, however, the Atlanta Journal-Constitution was not so
quick to give into Jewell's demands.54 It steadfastly refused to settle the
defamation action he filed against it.55 Part of that legal battle would turn
out to be a numbers game-a numbers game not of money, but of
interviews.56
In particular, between the time of the bombing and the time the initial
Scruggs/Martz article appeared identifying Jewell as a suspect, Jewell
"granted ten interviews and one photo shoot" to news media outlets.57 In
his appellate brief, Jewell elaborated, "Mr. Jewell's total media exposure
between July 27 and July 30 included 3 newspaper interviews, 7 television
interviews and 1 photo shoot., 5 8 These interviews and their corresponding
numbers would play a pivotal role in Jewell's libel action against the
newspaper.59 The question remaining is why?
A central issue in Richard Jewell's fight with the Atlanta Journal-
Constitution was whether Jewell would be treated by the courts as either a
public or a private figure.60 The resolution of this issue is critical in libel
law because the status of the plaintiff affects the degree of fault that he or
she must prove against the defendant.61 While public figures in Georgia
51. Id. at 693.
52. Lawrie Mifflin, NBC Pays to Avert a Suit By Ex-Bombing Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
10, 1996, at A16.
53. Id.
54. See generally Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 555 S.E.2d at 178.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 184.
57. Id.
58. Brief for Appellant, supra note 16, at 11. In several of these interviews, Jewell not only
describes the events surrounding the bombing but also his aspirations for future employment in
law enforcement. See Order, supra note 32, at 2 (describing Jewell's separate interviews with
CNN reporters Jeanne Meserve and Art Harris in which he talked about his hopes for
employment in law enforcement after the Olympics).
59. See Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 555 S.E.2d at 184.
60. See id. at 183 ("The central issue presented by this appeal is whether Jewell, as the
plaintiff in this defamation action, is a public or private figure, as those terms are used in
defamation cases.").
61. See Silvester v. ABC, Inc., 839 F.2d 1491, 1493 (1 1th Cir. 1988) (observing, in relevant
part, that "[tihe test for determining liability in a defamation case turns on whether the libeled
party is a public or private figure").
2002]
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must prove actual malice to succeed in their defamation actions,62 private
figures need only prove that a defendant acted with negligence. 63  Put
differently, a plaintiff would much rather be considered a private figure
because it would make his or her case easier to prove.64  The more
interviews that Jewell gave, the greater the possibility that he would be held
to be a public figure.65 Before considering how Jewell-the source-turned-
plaintiff as well as the hero-turned-villain-tumed-hero-would be treated
by the courts, it is important to understand the role that he and others like
him serve as sources of information for journalists.
III. GETTING THE STORY: WHY SOURCES ARE VITAL FOR JOURNALISM
Richard Jewell was used by many prominent journalism
organizations-the Atlanta Journal-Constitution,66 the Boston Globe,67
USA Today,68 CNN,69 and NBC7 -as a source of information regarding the
events surrounding the bombing in Centennial Olympic Park and the level
of security in the Park. 71 Because of Richard Jewell, these organizations
were able to convey information to the public about a newsworthy event:
two deaths, 11 1 injuries, and then-President Bill Clinton's call for new anti-
terrorism legislation.72 For instance, two days after the bombing, USA
Today ran a story replete with six paragraphs of unedited quotes from
Jewell describing what happened after he noticed the knapsack that
contained the bomb.73 It is without doubt that such first-hand, eyewitness
62. See Finkelstein v. Albany Herald Publ'g Co., 392 S.E.2d 559, 561 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990)
(observing that public figures must prove actual malice to recover damages for defamatory
statements concerning their involvement in controversies).
63. Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 555 S.E.2d at 183 ("Plaintiffs who are 'private persons'
must only prove that the defendant acted with ordinary negligence."); see Long v. Cooper, 848
F.2d 1202, 1204 (1 1th Cir. 1988) ("Because we conclude that appellants are private figures, they
are not required to show actual malice to recover compensatory damages.").
64. See generally Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 555 S.E.2d at 183.
65. See infra Part IV.B (describing the appellate court's decision on whether Jewell is a
public figure).
66. Atlanta Journal-Constitution v. Jewell, 555 S.E.2d 175, 182 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
67. See David M. Halbfinger, Routine Find Turns to Horror for Guard, BOSTON GLOBE,
July 28, 1996, at A27 (containing direct quotes from Jewell recalling the early morning when the
bomb exploded).
68. Mike Lopresti, Guard's Alertness in Park Makes Him an Unexpected Hero, U.S.A.
TODAY, July 29, 1996, at A4.
69. Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 555 S.E.2d at 182.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See Kevin Johnson, Police Eye Atlanta Suspect, USA TODAY, July 29, 1996, at 1A.
73. Lopresti, supra note 68.
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source accounts are vital for journalists to do their job of informing both
the nation and the world about events of public concern.74 Any change in
the law of libel that would jeopardize such information flow, such as
transforming private sources of information, like Richard Jewell, into
public figures when they merely tell their stories to the media, must be
seriously questioned.
Sources are the life-blood of reporting for journalists. 75 The authors
of a leading textbook on journalism ethics wrote in 1999 that "[s]ources are
the foundation of a journalist's success, developed and nurtured and often
protected for the future. The reputation a reporter or newspaper or
television station has for protecting sources who provide sensitive
information is a part of the continuing dynamic of successful journalism.
76
This sentiment is also echoed by Louis Alvin Day, the author of another
leading media ethics textbook.7 7 He writes that "[n]ews sources are the
cornerstone of good investigative journalism. 78
This is true, in part, because journalists "are seldom in a position to
witness events firsthand. They have to rely on the accounts of others. 79
Thus it is that "[t]he journalists monitoring the world on our behalf also
most often depend on others for the details of their reporting."
80
Journalists need sources not only to supply information, but also
because the journalistic tenet of objectivity requires that reporters remove
their own voice from stories while they let others-the sources--do the
talking.8' Indeed, it has been said by one prominent journalism scholar that
under the rules of objectivity, "[k]eeping the reporter out of the news
means relying on sources. 82
But journalism scholars and academics are not alone in
acknowledging the important relationship between sources and
74. See generally BILL KOVACH & TOM ROSENSTIEL, THE ELEMENTS OF JOURNALISM:
WHAT NEWSPEOPLE SHOULD KNOW AND THE PUBLIC SHOULD EXPECT 90 (2001).
75. See id.
76. JAY BLACK ET AL., DOING ETHICS IN JOURNALISM: A HANDBOOK WITH CASE STUDIES
264 (3d ed. 1999).
77. Louis A. DAY, ETHICS IN MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS: CASES AND CONTROVERSIES 170
(3d ed. 2000).
78. Id. at 170.
79. Leon V. Sigal, Sources Make the News, in READING THE NEWS 9, 15 (Robert Karl
Manoff& Michael Schudson eds., 1986).
80. KOVACH & ROSENSTIEL, supra note 74.
81. See Theodore L. Glasser, Objectivity Precludes Responsibility, QUILL, Feb. 1984, at 15
("[T]he objective reporter tends to function as a translator-translating the specialized language
of sources into a language intelligible to a lay audience.").
82. Sigal, supra note 79, at 16.
2002)
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journalism.83 The United States Supreme Court has recognized that
sources are vital for good journalism. 84 As Justice Douglas wrote in dissent
in Branzburg v. Hayes,85 "[a] reporter is no better than [the] source of [his]
information. 86 The Court has also expressed concern for changes in the
law that would inhibit sources from talking to journalists and, in the
process, have the effect of "diminishing [the] flow of potentially important
information to the public.,8 7 As set forth in the Introduction, the impact of
declaring Richard Jewell a public figure will potentially have such an
effect. Therefore, when a private person voluntarily provides such
"important information to the public, 88 he or she should not be punished
by being transformed into a public figure.
In 2001, the Court noted in Bartnicki v. Vopper89 that "[t]he essential
thrust of the First Amendment is to prohibit improper restraints on the
voluntary public expression of ideas .... .90 As a good Samaritan source,
Richard Jewell agreed voluntarily to speak with the media. Holding that he
is a public figure amounts to an improper restriction on such voluntary
public expression of ideas and, in particular, on accounts of an event of
public concern.
Most courts and many state legislatures recognize the importance of
sources for journalism and, concomitantly, for public discourse when they
create privileges--constitutional, common law, and statutory-that allow
journalists to protect source identity in certain situations. 91 Journalists, of
course, are the ones who argue strenuously for such reporter-source
privileges in order to protect the flow of information that otherwise might
be squelched by sources unwilling to talk to them unless given a promise of
83. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 679-80 (1972).
84. See id.
85. 408 U.S. 665.
86. Id. at 722 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
87. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 573 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
88. Id.
89. 121 S. Ct. 1753 (2001).
90. Id. at 1764 n.20 (quoting Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 244 N.E.2d 250,
255 (N.Y. 1968)) (emphasis in original).
91. See generally ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER AND
RELATED PROBLEMS § 14.3.2.2 (3d ed. 2001) ("[M]ost courts that have faced the question have
concluded that there is a First Amendment-based or common-law qualified privilege for a
journalist to protect the identity of a confidential source during the course of libel litigation.");
Confidential Sources: Introduction, Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, at
http://www.rcfp.org/csi/intro.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2001) (stating that "30 states and the
District of Columbia have enacted statutes-shield laws-that give journalists some form of
privilege against compelled production of confidential or unpublished information").
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confidentiality.92 Journalists argue that if they are forced "to reveal their
confidential sources, people would be reluctant to speak to reporters, 93
94thereby hindering their ability to report the news.
It is ironic that journalists would want a court to rule that an important
source was a public figure. On the one hand, journalists may claim they
need to protect and cultivate the confidentiality of sources in order to
further information flow to the public.95 At the same time, however, they
may make the case that sources who voluntarily talk to the media about
events of public concern should be transformed, via judicial sleight of
hand, into public figures-a decision that could markedly reduce the flow
of information to the public.96 The contradiction is evident: protect a
source here, burn a source there.
Indeed, the Atlanta Journal-Constitution "has consistently refused to
provide Jewell with the names of confidential sources who allegedly
provided its reporters with information concerning Jewell's status in the
investigation of the Olympic Park bombing." 97 The reason? A ruling
requiring the newspaper to disclose its sources would "undermine the
freedom of the press to collect and disseminate news. 98  Of course, a
ruling declaring sources like Richard Jewell public figures could have the
same effect. 99
Perhaps all is fair in love, war, and libel litigation-the latter two
being the same sometimes-when it comes to media defendants seeking
short-term rulings that good-faith sources whom they have used for
information should be treated like public figures. But, as this Part has set
forth, sources are vital for objective, quality journalism. Any ruling with
the potential to deter sources from speaking with the media should be
greeted with as much skepticism as celebration. With this in mind, the next
Part of this Article explains the different categories of public figure
plaintiffs that courts have recognized in libel law.
92. See generally KENT R. MIDDLETON ET AL., THE LAW OF PUBLIC COMMUNICATION 433
(4th ed. 1997).
93. Id. at 431.
94. Id.
95. See id. at 433.
96. See discussion infra Parts V.A.2. and VI.
97. Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 555 S.E.2d at 178.
98. Id. at 179.
99. See discussion supra Part I.
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IV. PUBLIC FIGURES IN LIBEL LAW: POSSIBILITIES AND PRECEDENT FOR
TREATMENT AS A PUBLIC FIGURE
The standard of fault' 0°-and very often the result-in a defamation
action hinges upon the status of the plaintiff as either a public or private
figure.'0 ' As noted earlier in this Article, under Georgia law, private
plaintiffs need only demonstrate ordinary negligence to recover damages,
while public figures are held to the actual malice standard. 0 2 Plaintiffs
would rather be classified as private figures because negligence is much
easier to prove than actual malice as negligence requires substantially less
degree of fault.'0 3  Determining the category into which a plaintiff like
Richard Jewell falls is left to courts as a matter of law.0 4 And although the
United States Supreme Court has created several factors to guide lower
courts in this determination, 105 the concept of public figure has eluded
precise definition. As Robert D. Sack, an expert on communications law
who now serves as a federal judge on the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, 0 6 wrote in his treatise on libel, "[t]he law pursuant to which
courts determine who is and who is not a 'public figure,' however, is
chaotic."'
10 7
The confusion over the precise defining features leaves wide latitude
for courts to squeeze plaintiffs into categories that sometimes do not
properly fit. Indeed, that may be one reason the appellate court in Georgia
was able to classify Jewell as a public figure. 10 8 The following discussion
examines the public-figure classification and, specifically, how three
categories-all-purpose, limited-purpose, and involuntary public figures-
have evolved over time.
100. In defamation law, the standard of fault is typically either negligence or actual malice.
"[P]eople are considered negligent when they fail to exercise ordinary or reasonable care."
ZELEZNY, supra note 11. In libel law, the issue is whether a writer exercised reasonable care in
determining whether a story was true or false. See id. at 119-28. Actual malice is defined as the
publication of a statement made "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not." N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).
101. See Atlanta Journal-Constitution v. Jewell, 555 S.E.2d 175, 183 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
102. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text. Georgia is in accord with the vast
majority of states on the issue of the fault standard that applies when the plaintiff in a libel action
is a private figure. See Kyu Ho Youm, Libel Law and the Press: US. and South Korea
Compared, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 231, 245 (1995) ("[T]hirty-four states seem to have
applied a negligence standard.").
103. See, e.g., Khawar v. Globe Int'l., Inc., 19 Cal. 4th 254, 274 (1998).
104. See Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ'ns, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1293 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
105. See Gertz v. Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351-52 (1974).
106. See generally SACK, supra note 91.
107. SACK, supra note 91, § 5.3.1.
108. See Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 555 S.E.2d at 186.
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A. All-Purpose Public Figures
Some individuals, by the very nature of their work, spend
considerable time in the public eye. Certainly this holds true for public
officials---"those among the hierarchy of government employees who have,
or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over
the conduct of governmental affairs.' ' 10 9
But what about non-governmental employees? Others outside
government service may also occupy a position in the public spotlight. For
instance, movie stars and nationally recognized television personalities,
whose achievements spark interest and genuine curiosity among the general
population, would be considered public figures." 0 The ubiquitous nature
of their images warrants a special classification in the law. Additionally, in
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,"' the United States Supreme Court recognized
that "[i]n some instances an individual may achieve such pervasive fame or
notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all
contexts.""12 The Gertz Court held that these people "occupy positions of
such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures
for all purposes."
' 13
Three years after the Supreme Court ruled that public officials must
prove actual malice to recover damages in a defamation lawsuit,"14 the
Court faced the question of whether public figures-those who have
achieved special prominence without an official government capacity-
should also be subject to a heightened fault requirement.' 15
In 1962, Wally Butts was the athletic director at the University of
Georgia when the Saturday Evening Post published an article accusing him
109. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966) (defining who constitutes a "public official"
in light of the Court's decision two years earlier in N.Y Times Co. v. Sullivan, and holding that
such plaintiffs are required to prove actual malice in defamation lawsuits).
110. See DONALD M. GILLMOR ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF MASS COMMUNICATION LAW
58 (1996) (describing that all-purpose public figures in libel law "include the stars of stage and
screen, the great athletes of our time, the prize winners, the creators of our fads and fashions, the
great corporations, and the movers and shakers"); see, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485
U.S. 46, 57 n.5 (1988) (finding that the Rev. Jerry Falwell, former head of the Moral Majority
and host of a national television show, was a public figure for purposes of the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress).
111. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
112. Id. at 351.
113. Id. at 345.
114. NY Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80 (The "constitutional guarantees" of the First
Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment require a "public official" to prove actual malice in
defamation actions relating to official conduct.).
115. See Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 134 (1967).
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of "conspiring to 'fix' a football game between the University of Georgia
and the University of Alabama .... ,, 16 Prior to becoming athletic director,
Butts had been a well-known head football coach at the University of
Georgia and aspired to become a professional coach. 117 According to the
story published in the Saturday Evening Post under the headline "The Story
of a College Football Fix," Butts supplied legendary Alabama coach Paul
Bryant with confidential tactics, plays and other key information used by
Georgia's football team.'18  Butts sued the magazine's publisher for
defamation. 19
Although Butts was working at the University of Georgia, a state
institution, he was actually employed by the Georgia Athletic Association,
a private entity.120 Accordingly, a strict reading of New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan'2' would not apply without the official connection to government.
Nonetheless, as the Court in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts 2 2 noted, it is
appropriate in libel cases to investigate "the plaintiffs position to
determine whether he has a legitimate call upon the court for protection in
light of his prior activities and means of self-defense."' 123 The Court further
found that Butts was properly classified as a public figure and indeed "may
have attained that status by position alone,"' 124 and thus held that a
heightened liability standard applied.
125
The Court further molded the all-purpose public figure classification
seven years later in Gertz, when it ruled that this status is conveyed on
people in the public arena "by reason of the notoriety of their achievements
or the vigor and success with which they seek the public's
attention .... ,126 Drawing upon that definition, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Waldbaum v. Fairchild
Publications, Inc. 12 7 clarified that an all-purpose public figure is "a well-
known 'celebrity,' his name a 'household word.' The public recognizes
him and follows his words and deeds, either because it regards his ideas,
conduct, or judgment as worthy of its attention or because he actively
116. Id. at 135.
117. Id. at 135-36.
118. See id. at 136.
119. See generally id.
120. Id. at 135.
121. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
122. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
123. Id. at 154.
124. Id. at 155.
125. See Curtis Publ'g Co., 388 U.S. at 155.
126. 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
127. 627 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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pursues that consideration."
' 128
The rationale for holding all-purpose public figures to a higher fault
standard relates to their ability to draw upon their public influence to
counter criticism once it spills over into the public arena. 29  As the
appellate court in Waldbaum suggested, "[t]he public's proven
preoccupation with [a public figure] indicates that the media would cover
such an individual's response to statements he believes are inaccurate or
unsupported."' 130 The media have a right to publish stories-both favorable
and unfavorable-about subjects their audiences would find appealing.
31
Fame has its consequences for public people, and the "renouncement of
anonymity or tolerance of publicity unavoidably carries with it the
possibility that the press, in fulfilling its role of reporting and critiquing
matters of public concern, may investigate their talents, character, and
motives."'
32
Having set forth its comprehensive analysis of the all-purpose public
figure, the appellate court in Waldbaum conceded that few people ever
reach the notoriety required to be classified general public figures.
133
Indeed, in the case of Richard Jewell, even the Atlanta Journal-
Constitution did not contend that Jewell was an all-purpose public figure.'
34
It is more often the case that an individual would come to occupy public-
figure status in a more limited arena through some voluntary action
designed to influence a particular public issue. 
135
B. Voluntary Limited-Purpose Public Figures
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that the most
common way for people to become public figures is to "thrust themselves
to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the
128. Id. at 1294. The court noted in an accompanying footnote that it is irrelevant whether
the respect is merited; rather, "the proper question is whether a reasonable person would conclude
that, in fact, the public pays him heed." Id. at 1294 n.15.
129. Id. at 1291 (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344).
130. Id. at 1294 (citing Note, An Analysis of the Distinction Between Public Figures and
Private Defamation Plaintiffs Applied to Relatives of Public Persons, 49 S. CAL L. REV. 1131,
1210 (1976).
131. See id. at 1291-92.
132. Id. at 1294.
133. Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1296.
134. See Brief of Appellees at 8-30, Jewell v. Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 555 S.E.2d. 175
(Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (No. A01A1565) [hereinafter Brief of Appellees] (arguing that Jewell was a
voluntary limited-purpose public figure, an involuntary public figure, and a public official).
135. See discussion infra Part IV.B (describing this classification).
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resolution of the issues involved."'' 36 In Gertz, Elmer Gertz, a lawyer who
represented the family of a youth killed by a Chicago police officer, was
inaccurately labeled, among other things, a "Leninist" and a "Communist-
fronter" in American Opinion, a magazine published by the John Birch
Society. 13 7 The publisher of the magazine argued that Gertz had propelled
himself into public-figure status through his activities, 3 8 but the Court
disagreed, writing that: "[h]e plainly did not thrust himself into the vortex
of this public issue, nor did he engage the public's attention in an attempt to
influence its outcome."'
139
This language from the Court's opinion in Gertz has been used to
fashion the test for determining who is a "'vortex' public figure' 14° or a
limited-purpose public figure. 14 1 The test focuses on three factors: (1) the
plaintiff's voluntary thrust into (2) a public controversy in an attempt (3) to
influence the outcome. 142 Courts interpreting the Gertz test have expanded
upon the meaning of these three prongs. 43  In Waldbaum, the court
concluded "that a person has become a public figure for limited purposes if
he is attempting to have, or realistically can be expected to have, a major
impact on the resolution of a specific public dispute that has foreseeable
and substantial ramifications for persons beyond its immediate
participants."'
144
The question of media access often plays a role in determining the
plaintiff's status. 145  In Hutchinson v. Proxmire,146 Hutchinson was the
subject of Senator William Proxmire's "Golden Fleece of the Month
Award"'147 for wasteful government spending. 4 8  Hutchinson used the
media simply to respond to allegations Proxmire had put forth in his floor
comments and press releases. 49 While Proxmire tried to use Hutchinson's
remarks to newspapers and wire services as a controlling factor in
136. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
137. Id. at 325-26.
138. Id. at 351.
139. Id. at 352.
140. See SACK, supra note 91, § 1.5 n. 196 (tracing the evolution of the term to Rosenblatt,
383 U.S. at 86 n. 12 (defining "public official")); Curtis Publ'g Co., 388 U.S. at 155.
141. SACK, supra note 91, § 1.5.
142. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352.
143. See, e.g., Waldbaum, 627 F.2d 1287.
144. Id. at 1292.
145. See id.
146. 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
147. Id. at 114.
148. Id.
149. See id. at 134.
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determining whether the researcher was a limited-purpose public figure,150
the Supreme Court reasoned that "Hutchinson's access was limited to
responding to the announcement of the Golden Fleece Award. He did not
have the regular and continuing access to the media that is one of the
accouterments of having become a public figure."'
15 1
In similar fashion, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals more recently
found that "context" was critical in looking at the media exposure of a
given plaintiff.15 2 If the plaintiffs use of the media was solely to respond
to accusations "in a reasonable attempt to vindicate their reputations," the
court would be "extremely reluctant to attribute public-figure status to
,,153otherwise private persons ....
Likewise, private individuals who invoke the court system to settle
the ordinary vicissitudes of life will not be catapulted into public-figure
status by that act alone. 54 When Mary Alice Firestone sought a divorce
from her industrial-magnet husband, the United States Supreme Court
found that the "[d]issolution of a marriage through judicial proceedings is
not the sort of 'public controversy' referred to in Gertz .... ,155 Mrs.
Firestone was "compelled" to use the court system to obtain a divorce, but
"assumed no 'special prominence in the resolution of public questions."' 56
The public's curiosity about "the marital difficulties of extremely wealthy
individuals"'157 is not a sufficient justification for finding a public
150. See id.
151. Id. at 136. The Court rejected the notion that Hutchinson's research created the public
controversy, suggesting that "[t]o the extent the subject of his published writings became a matter
of controversy, it was a consequence of the Golden Fleece Award. Clearly, those charged with
defamation cannot, by their own conduct, create their own defense by making the claimant a
public figure." Id. at 135.
152. See Foretich v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 37 F.3d 1541, 1558 (4th Cir. 1994). This
court's analysis of the limited-purpose public figure doctrine begins with "the initial presumption
that the defamation plaintiff is a private individual" and requires the defendant to prove
otherwise. Id. at 1553. To assist in the determination of voluntary limited-purpose public figure
status, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals developed a five-part test that requires the defendant
to prove that:
(1) the plaintiff had access to channels of effective communication; (2) the plaintiff
voluntarily assumed a role of special prominence in the public controversy; (3) the
plaintiff sought to influence the resolution or outcome of the controversy; (4) the
controversy existed prior to the publication of the defamatory statement; and (5) the
plaintiff retained public-figure status at the time of the alleged defamation.
Id. (citing Reuber v. Food Chem. News, Inc., 925 F.2d 703, 708-11 (8th Cir. 1991) and Fitzgerald
v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 691 F.2d 666, 668 (4th Cir. 1982)).
153. Foretich, 37 F.3d at 1558.
154. See, e.g., id.
155. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976).
156. Id. at 454-55 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351).
157. Id. at 454.
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controversy.158  Viewed slightly differently, Mrs. Firestone did not
voluntarily invite public attention.
1 59
The Court has been consistent with this notion that "[a] private
individual is not automatically transformed into a public figure just by
becoming involved in or associated with a matter that attracts public
attention. 1 60  Nonetheless, the Atlanta Journal-Constitution argued that
Richard Jewell was a voluntary limited-purpose public figure.'
6'
C. Involuntary Public Figures
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution also contended that Jewell fit into
another category of public figure-that of the involuntary public figure.
62
In Gertz, the Court suggested that "it may be possible for someone to
become a public figure through no purposeful action of his own, but the
instances of truly involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare."
1 63
Clearly, while the Court did not wish to slam the door completely on the
involuntary public figure category, it intended the public figure
classification to cover other people.1 64  Specifically, those individuals
whose "persuasive power and influence" raise them to the level of an all-
purpose public figure 165 or, at the very least, those who voluntarily inject
themselves into a controversy to affect the outcome.' 66  As the Court
pointed out, "they invite attention and comment."
' 67
The involuntary category continues to be a source of strain among
legal scholars and courts alike. As Judge Robert D. Sack wrote in his
treatise on defamation law, under the Supreme Court's definition,
involuntary public figures are not rare, but are "a contradiction in terms."
1 68
He also praised the trial court's decision in Schultz v. Reader's Digest
Ass'n 169 for finding there is "no such thing as an involuntary public
figure."'
17 0
158. Id.
159. See id.
160. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 167 (1979).
161. See Brief of Appellees, supra note 134, at 16-21.
162. Id. at 22-24.
163. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
164. See id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See SACK, supra note 91, § 5.3.11.3.
169. 468 F. Supp. 551 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
170. See SACK, supra note 91, § 5.3.11.3.
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However not all federal judges subscribe to Judge Sack's
philosophy.1 71 In Carson v. Allied News Co.,172 the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals concluded entertainer Johnny Carson's wife became a public
figure in a defamation action because "one can assume that the wife of a
public figure such as Carson more or less automatically becomes at least a
part-time public figure herself.
1 73
An even more disturbing inconsistency with the Gertz rationale174 is
the federal appellate court ruling in Dameron v. Washington Magazine,
Inc. 175 Dameron involved the defamation suit by an air traffic controller
who was the sole person on duty the day in 1974 when TWA Flight 727
crashed into Mt. Weather.1 76 A sidebar story on air safety appearing eight
years later in The Washingtonian magazine reported that while errors by air
traffic controllers were not the sole cause of any major crashes, "[t]hey
have been assigned partial blame in a few accidents, including the 1974
crash of a TWA 727 into Mt. Weather in Virginia upon approach to Dulles
(92 fatalities) .. .
When Merle Dameron sued the magazine, the question of his status
became a key issue.178 The appellate court found that although Dameron
did not inject himself into the controversy, "[p]ersons can become involved
in public controversies and affairs without their consent or will."' 79 The
court ultimately concluded that because of Dameron's position in the
control tower that day, he became "an in voluntary [sic] public figure for
the limited purpose of discussions of the Mt. Weather crash."'
180
Compare the decision in Dameron from the District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals, with the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals'
decision in Wells v. Liddy. 181 In Wells, Ida Maxwell Wells, a secretary at
the Democratic National Committee at the time of the Watergate break-in,
sued Watergate operative G. Gordon Liddy,1 82 claiming he publicly stated
"that she acted as a procurer of prostitutes for men who visited the
171. See, e.g., Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 210 (7th Cir. 1976).
172. 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976).
173. Id. at 210.
174. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
175. Dameron v. Wash. Magazine, Inc., 779 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
176. Id. at 738.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 741.
180. Id.
181. Wells v. Liddy, 186 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999).
182. Id. at 512.
2002]
312 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:293
DNC."'
183
Liddy argued that Wells was an involuntary public figure. 184  The
appellate court refused to qualify her as such. 8 5 Instead, it pointed out that
"[s]o rarely have courts determined that an individual was an involuntary
public figure that commentators have questioned the continuing existence
of that category."' 6 Nonetheless, the court set out a test that would capture
"that 'exceedingly rare' individual" who became "a principal in an
important public matter."'' 8 7  First, "an involuntary public figure has
pursued a course of conduct from which it was reasonably foreseeable, at
the time of the conduct, that public interest would arise. A public
controversy must have actually arisen that is related to, although not
necessarily causally linked, to the action."'188 Second, the individual "must
be recognized as a central figure during debate over that matter."'
8 9
These cases illustrate the difficulty courts have when they grapple
with the public figure question. It is unsettled whether the Gertz Court ever
intended for plaintiffs to be sucked unwittingly into the vortex of a
controversy when it left open the possibility of an involuntary public
figure,' 90 but one fact is certain: courts have been inconsistent in the
application of this undefined concept.' 9 '
From a libel plaintiffs perspective, the involuntary public figure
category is particularly troubling because it allows news media
organizations to turn that individual into a public figure through their own
coverage of an individual. 92 This transformation can only help the media
should that individual sue them for libel. No person, once they become the
source of news, public or private, can control the news media's decision
whether to cover him or her as part of its reporting.' 93 The courts have
made it clear that editing is for editors, not for courts.
94
183. Id. at 518.
184. Id. at 531. Liddy argued, alternatively, that "Wells's participation in Watergate-related
dialogue is sufficient to qualify her as a voluntary limited-purpose public figure." Id.
185. See id. at 542.
186. Id. at 538 (citing RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 2.14 (1998)).
187. Wells, 186 F.3d at 540.
188. Id.
189. Id. The court also retained the fourth and fifth part of the Foretich test articulated by
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. See supra text accompanying note 142 (setting forth the
first three factors).
190. See Gertz, 418 U.S. 323.
191. Compare Dameron, 779 F.2d 736, with Wells, 186 F.3d 505.
192. See, e.g., Dameron, 779 F.2d 736.
193. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
194. Id.
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For instance, in Miami Herald v. Tornillo,195 the United States
Supreme Court wrote that "[t]he choice of material to go into a newspaper"
falls within the province of an editor's control and judgment, not the
government. 196 In the broadcasting context, the Court previously remarked
in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National
Committee'97 that "[flor better or worse, editing is what editors are for; and
editing is selection and choice of material."'198  More recently, the
California Supreme Court wrote that "[i]n general, it is not for a court or
jury to say how a particular story is best covered."'
199
Due to judicial deference to journalistic judgment, editors and
reporters hold complete power and control to dictate public figure status
under the involuntary public figure doctrine. 200  The involuntary public
figure doctrine thus allows the press to control an area of libel law that it
can use to its advantage in defending defamation actions.
With the three categories of public figures in mind, the next Part of
this Article turns to the issue of whether Richard Jewell, for purposes of his
defamation action against the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, fits into any of
these groups.
V. RICHARD JEWELL AS A PUBLIC FIGURE: CRITIQUING THE APPELLATE
COURT'S DECISION
A. The Arguments
1. Richard Jewell's Argument
A key part of Richard Jewell's argument that he was not a voluntary
limited-purpose public figure was that he did not thrust himself into a
public controversy. 2°1 As his attorneys explained in their appellate brief,
"[b]etween July 27 and July 30, Mr. Jewell never undertook any purposeful
action to arrange or obtain any television, newspaper or wire service
interview to attract public attention to himself. 20 2 They added that "Mr.
195. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
196. Id. at 258.
197. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
198. Id. at 124.
199. Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 485 (Cal. 1998).
200. See id.
201. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 16, at 16.
202. Id. at 5.
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Jewell did not initiate or seek any of the interviews that he participated in
between July 27 and July 30,,,203 and that in all but one case, it was "the
media [who] approached AT&T to obtain Mr. Jewell's eyewitness
accounts."
204
As Part IV of this Article explained,20 5 these facts are critical because
the United States Supreme Court defined voluntary limited-purpose public
figures in terms of individuals who "thrust themselves" into a public
controversy.20 6 There was not, as Jewell's counsel argued on appeal, any
"voluntary thrusting' 7 by their client.20 8
On top of this, Jewell's attorneys adroitly framed the limited number
of interviews that Jewell gave to the media before July 30, 1996 within "the
context of the total number of media covering the Olympics and the
massive media coverage of the Olympic Park bombing. 20 9 In particular,
Jewell's counsel pointed out that there were 116 articles covering the
Olympic Park bombing that the Atlanta Journal-Constitution published
between July 27 and July 30.210 These articles, in turn, mentioned 351
individuals by name.2 ' Yet "[o]ut of the 351 names and 116 articles, Mr.
Jewell's name is associated with only three (3) articles," and in two of
those cases, his name was used "only as a byline to a photograph of
him. 212 Of course, the point of this argument is that Jewell was not "an
especially prominent person at the forefront of a public controversy.
' 21 3
On the related point of whether Jewell intended to influence the
outcome of a public controversy, counsel for Jewell argued that his
comments to the media before July 30 rarely touched on the controversy of
safety at Centennial Olympic Park.214 As his attorneys contended, "Mr.
Jewell's failure in 5 of 8 documented interviews to even mention the topic
of Olympic Park safety is compelling, if not decisive, evidence of Mr.
Jewell's lack of intent to influence or impact the trial court-defined
203. Id. at 16.
204. Id.
205. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
206. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
207. Reply Brief of Appellant at 7, Jewell v. Cox Enters., Inc., 555 S.E.2d 175 (Ga. Ct.
App., June 4, 2001) (No. A01A1565) [hereinafter Reply Brief of Appellant].
208. See id.
209. Id. at 4.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Reply Brief of Appellant, supra note 207, at 4-5.
214. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 16, at 20.
A PYRRHIC PRESS VICTORY
controversy. 2 15
On the issue of whether Jewell was an involuntary public figure, his
attorneys argued that "the category of involuntary limited-purpose public
figures has never been recognized except as a hypothetical status under
modem U.S. Supreme Court precedent. 21 6
2. The Atlanta Journal-Constitution's Argument
In their brief to the appellate court, counsel for the Atlanta Journal-
Constitution argued that Richard Jewell was a voluntary limited-purpose
public figure both because he was under "no obligation to speak with the
,,2 17 beaspress, and because he "engaged in a vigorous schedule of appearances
in the local and national media., 21 8 In reference to the former, the Atlanta
Journal-Constitution emphasized that Jewell "was never told that AT&T
required him to do the interviews,, 219 but instead "made a voluntary,
considered decision to make all of his media appearances.,
220
Moreover, the brief alternatively referred to Jewell's schedule of
appearances as a "busy media schedule122' and a "hectic schedule. 222 The
Atlanta Journal-Constitution brief also referred to the AT&T media
relations coordinator as Jewell's "media handler, 2 23 implicitly suggesting
that he actively sought out the media, rather than waiting for the media to
approach him.224 In addition, to show that Jewell was a prominent figure,
the brief did not focus on the small number of media interviews that Jewell
actually granted between July 27 and July 30. Instead, it focused on the
fact that "millions of American's [sic] heard and read appellant's
comments .... ,,225 In other words, it was not the number of interviews
alone but the size of the audience that was important.226
215. Id.
216. Id. at 27-28. This hypothetical status is drawn from Gertz, 418 U.S. at 323; see also
discussion supra Part IV.C.
217. Brief of Appellees, supra note 134, at 4.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 20.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 6.
222. Id.
223. Brief of Appellees, supra note 134, at 15.
224. See Atlanta Journal-Constitution v. Jewell, 555 S.E.2d 175, 184-85 (Ga. Ct. App.
2001).
225. Brief of Appellees, supra note 134, at 7.
226. See Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 555 S.E.2d at 185.
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To buttress this argument, the Atlanta Journal-Constitution repeatedly
emphasized that the news organizations that interviewed Jewell were
"some of the most prominent members of the national media. 2 27  For
instance, it stressed that Jewell "met with reporters from the nation's
largest circulation newspaper, USA Today., 228  He also spoke with a
reporter from "one of the nation's largest newspapers, the Washington
Post, 22 9 appeared on "the nation's preeminent news network, CNN,
230
and was a guest "on Today, the nation's most watched morning news
program.",231  The Atlanta Journal-Constitution emphasized that these
various news organizations were "prominent national media outlets. 232
The logic of the Atlanta Journal-Constitution seems clear-if Jewell spoke
to "prominent" news media organizations, then he must have been a
prominent figure, and by extension, a voluntary limited-purpose public
figure. 3 In other words, in determining one's status as a public or private
figure, it is not only how many interviews one gives, but with whom one
interviews that determines one's status as a private or public figure.234
On the question of whether Jewell was an involuntary public figure,
the Atlanta Journal-Constitution argued that he became such a person "by
virtue of his unique and central role in the Olympic Park controversy. 23s
In its appellate brief, the Atlanta Journal-Constitution contended that this
rare category of public figure was not dead letter, but a viable classification
for a man who "repeatedly addressed various aspects of a controversy in
the national media, ' 236 and who "engaged in a hectic schedule of press
interviews to comment on the bombing and safety-related issues. 237
B. The Decision
The Georgia Court of Appeals issued its decision in October 2001.238
Causing severe setback for Richard Jewell, the appellate court ruled that he
227. Brief of Appellees, supra note 134, at 14.
228. Id. at 6.
229. Id. at 5.
230. Id. at 4.
231. Id. at 7.
232. Id. at 2.
233. See Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 555 S.E.2d at 184-85.
234. See id. at 184.
235. Brief of Appellees, supra note 134, at 2-3.
236. Id. at 23.
237. Id. at 24.
238. Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 555 S.E.2d at 175.
A PYRRHIC PRESS VICTORY
was both a voluntary limited-purpose public figure239 and an involuntary
public figure.240  The court went further in what might be considered a
hypothetical approach of alternative rationales for its holding, perhaps in
anticipation of an appeal to either the Georgia Supreme Court or the United
States Supreme Court.
2 41
1. Jewell is a Voluntary Limited-Purpose Public Figure
On the question of whether Jewell was a voluntary limited-purpose
public figure, the appellate court applied a three-part test like that described
earlier.242 First, it considered whether there was an existing public
controversy and, in particular, what the nature of the public controversy
was.243 As Jewell's attorney's had argued, the appellate court accepted the
trial court's finding that the public controversy was not the issue of who
bombed Centennial Olympic Park, but rather the larger and more general
issue of safety in the Park and at other Olympic venues. 44 Thus, the court
determined that the issue of Olympic Park safety was a public
controversy.
245
Discussing the second-prong, the court considered the nature and
extent of Jewell's involvement in the controversy surrounding safety in
Centennial Olympic Park.246 The appellate court paid particular attention
to the number of media interviews Jewell gave before he became a
suspect.247 The court wrote:
[W]e agree with the trial court that Jewell's actions show that he
voluntarily assumed a position of influence in the controversy.
Jewell granted ten interviews and one photo shoot in the three
days between the bombing and the reopening of the park, mostly
to prominent members of the national press. While no magical
number of media appearances is required to render a citizen a
public figure, Jewell's participation in the public discussion of
239. Id. at 185 (concluding that the "evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's
determination that Jewell was a voluntary limited-purpose public figure").
240. Id. at 186 (concluding that "the record contains clear and convincing evidence that, at
the very least, Jewell was an involuntary limited-purpose public figure").
241. See id.
242. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
243. See Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 555 S.E.2d at 183-84.
244. Judge Mather found there was a public controversy "[a]t least as to the issue of
Olympic Park safety .... " Order, supra note 32, at 9.
245. Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 555 S.E.2d at 183.
246. Id. at 184.
247. See id.
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the bombing exceeds what has been deemed sufficient to render
other citizens public figures. Even Jewell commented that the
number of interviews he gave-up to two or three within a
fifteen-minute period-was so great that he still cannot
remember them all.248
It is worth noting that the appellate court literally took part of this language
from a brief filed by attorneys for the Atlanta Journal-Constitution and
used it almost verbatim in its opinion.
249
Beyond the raw number of interviews that Jewell gave, the appellate
court also considered the extent of press coverage given by the media to his
comments.250 In language that chastised Jewell- a man who had no prior
media experience-for not realizing the impact of his comments, the court
wrote that "Jewell should have known, and likely did know, that his
comments would be broadcast and published to millions of American
citizens searching for answers in the aftermath of the bombing.
251
Finally, the appellate court turned to the third prong of its test for
voluntary limited-purpose public figure status: "whether the allegedly
defamatory statements were germane to Jewell's participation in the
controversy., 252  The court quickly concluded that the statements were
germane, writing:
Certainly, the information reported regarding Jewell's character
was germane to Jewell's participation in the controversy over
the Olympic Park's safety. A public figure's talents, education,
experience, and motives are relevant to the public's decision to
listen to him. The articles and the challenged statements within
them dealt with Jewell's status as a suspect in the bombing and
his law enforcement background.253
With that statement, the appellate court concluded that Richard Jewell
satisfied all three prongs of its test for a voluntary limited-purpose public
248. Id.
249. See Brief of Appellees, supra note 134, at 9 ("No magic number of media appearances
is required to render a citizen a public figure. However, the record shows that appellant's
participation in the public discussion of the bombing far exceed [sic] what has been deemed
sufficient to render other citizens public figures.").
250. Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 555 S.E.2d at 184. The appellate court wrote that "[i]n
examining the nature and extent of Jewell's participation in the issue of Olympic Park safety, the
court can look to Jewell's past conduct, the extent ofpress coverage, and the public reaction to his
... statements." Id. (emphasis added).
251. Id. at 185.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 185-86.
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figure.254 But the court did not stop there; it turned to the question of
whether Jewell was also an involuntary public figure.255 Its analysis of that
issue is discussed below.
2. Jewell Is an Involuntary Limited-Purpose Public Figure
The appellate court concluded that Richard Jewell was an involuntary
public figure "who had the misfortune to have a tragedy occur on his
watch .... Relying heavily on the case of Dameron v. Washington
Magazine, Inc.,257 the court observed "that Jewell played a central, albeit
possibly involuntary, role in the controversy over Olympic Park safety.,
258
Further, "[w]hether he liked it or not, Jewell became a central figure in the
specific public controversy with respect to which he was allegedly
defamed: the controversy over park safety.,
259
In reaching this decision, the appellate court failed to cite the
language from the United States Supreme Court's decision in Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc.,260 which states that the category of involuntary public
figures "must be exceedingly rare.26' Indeed, the Georgia appellate
court's only cite to language from Gertz regarding the categories of public
figures was to use ellipses to delete these words.262
254. See id. at 183-86.
255. See Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 555 S.E.2d at 186.
256. Id.
257. 779 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see supra notes 175-80 and accompanying text.
258. Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 555 S.E.2d at 186.
259. Id.
260. 418 U.S. 323 (1973).
261. Id. at 345 (emphasis added).
262. Atlanta Journal Constitution, 555 S.E.2d at 183. The United States Supreme Court
wrote:
Hypothetically, it may be possible for someone to become a public figure through
no purposeful action of his own, but the instances of truly involuntary public
figures must be exceedingly rare. For the most part those who attain this status have
assumed roles of special prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy
positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public
figures for all purposes. More commonly, those classed as public figures have
thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to
influence the resolution of the issues involved. In either event, they invite attention
and comment.
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345. The Georgia appellate court, however, pulls one line from page 342 of
the Gertz decision and collapses it with part of the quote above from page 345 of that opinion,
cleverly using ellipses to avoid quoting the "exceedingly rare" language. Compare Atlanta
Journal Constitution, 555 S.E.2d at 183, with Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342-45. The edited quote set out
in the Jewell decision by the state appellate court reads as follows, with the ellipses supplied by
the judges, not by the authors of this article:
Those who, by reason of the notoriety of their achievements or the vigor and
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C. The Critique
There is no denying that Richard Jewell was not forced, physically or
otherwise, to give interviews to members of the media263-he did them out
of his own free will.264  Jewell also participated in interviews upon the
media's request 265 and gave information that they used-both in print and
266on the air-to inform the public and to attract readers and viewers.
Jewell was unfortunately punished and made into a public figure by
the trial and appellate courts in Georgia simply because he had something
important and interesting to say. He was punished for expressing what he
believed to be the truth and was chastised for merely exercising his First
Amendment right to free speech.267
The media approached Jewell for comments on an issue of public
concern, resulting in Jewell voluntarily making less than a dozen media
appearances. This alone should not have turned Jewell into a public figure
for purposes of defamation law. If Richard Jewell hired a publicity firm
that actively sought news media outlets for interviews, or if Jewell looked
for media organizations with which to share his story, the situation would
have been quite different. At that point, Jewell arguably would have
willfully thrust himself into the media limelight. To the contrary, the facts
show that the media approached Jewell, instead of the reverse.268 He was
not a "Rolodex pundit, 269 despite the Atlanta Journal-Constitution's
success with which they seek the public's attention, are properly classified as public
figures.... For the most part those who attain this status have assumed roles of
special prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy positions of such
persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all
purposes. More commonly, those classed as public figures have thrust themselves
to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the
resolution of the issues involved. In either event, they invite attention and
comment.
Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 555 S.E.2d at 183 (citation omitted).
263. See Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 555 S.E.2d at 184.
264. See id.
265. See id.
266. See id. at 185.
267. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part that
"Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ...." U.S.
CONST. amend. I. The Free Speech and Free Press rights have been incorporated through the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause to apply to state and local government entities and
officials. Gitlow v. N.Y., 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
268. See Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 555 S.E.2d at 184 ("Jewell was prominent enough to
require the assistance of a media handler to field press inquiries and coordinate his media
appearances.").
269. See generally Alicia C. Shepard, White Noise, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Jan.-Feb. 1999,
at 20 (describing the use and misuse of pundits in journalism).
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argument that Jewell's media exposure "would inspire envy in the savviest
pundits. 270
Yet the appellate court gave short shrift to Jewell's contention that
"he gave the interviews only to accommodate the desires of his
,,271 cuta ,272employer .... 1 The court dismissed this as his "subjective motives,
and decided what was more important was "whether a reasonable person
would have concluded that Jewell would play or was seeking to play a
major role in determining the outcome of the controversy. '273
It is important here to look back to Gertz.274 It defined the category of
voluntary limited-purpose public figures to include people who "thrust
themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to
influence the resolution of the issues involved., 275 Jewell did not thrust
himself into any controversy, and he did not thrust himself upon the
media.276 He merely accommodated the media.277 The media wanted him
as a source and he obliged. However, under the rulings of both Judge
Mather at the trial court level and the unanimous opinion of Judge Johnson
at the appellate level, it became apparent that Richard Jewell would lose in
front of the media and the public.
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution paid close attention to Jewell's
responses during the media interviews that highlighted his training as a
security guard,278 his actions at Centennial Olympic Park on the night of
the bombing,279 and his thanks to the public for continuing to support the
Games. 280 These responses purportedly helped "many millions of
Americans to formulate views on the bombing and the response.,' 28 1 This
shortsighted focus on these off-the-cuff responses missed the point that
Richard Jewell became a sought-after interviewee because he witnessed
certain events on the night of the bombing, not for his influence on the
American public. It is textbook journalism that eyewitnesses are important
interview subjects because no one else can "describe what it was like to
270. Brief of Appellees, supra note 134, at 14.
271. Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 555 S.E.2d at 185.
272. Id.
273. Id. (discussing Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ'ns, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1298 (D.C. Cir.
1980)).
274. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
275. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345 (emphasis added).
276. See Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 555 S.E.2d at 183 (referring to Jewell's arguments).
277. See Jewell v. Cox Enters., Inc., 555 S.E.2d 175 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
278. Brief of Appellees, supra note 134, at 11-12.
279. Id. at 12-13.
280. Id. at 13.
281. Id. at 14.
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watch the event develop.,
28 2
Granted, Jewell could have declined to answer any questions that did
not directly relate to the events he witnessed. Unlike Jewell, a trained
media expert could have made that judgment on the spot. However, such a
refusal by itself could have been construed as contributing to the
controversy of the safety at Centennial Olympic Park. After all, if the
security guard at the scene of the bombing refused to say that he had the
proper training to handle the situation, that omission alone would be
sufficient to raise safety concerns. Likewise, if he refused to say that
people should continue attending the games, he would have sparked a
controversy. In short, to accept the view that his answers to non-
eyewitness questions pushed him over the line into public-figure territory
effectively condemned Richard Jewell to that status from the moment he
agreed to an interview.
Furthermore, in terms of the involuntary public figure doctrine
resurrected by the appellate court in Georgia, this doctrine might as well be
called the "bad luck" or "too bad, so sad" doctrine. Jewell's "bad luck" of
being a hero harmed him because "[h]e became embroiled in the ensuing
discussion and controversy over park safety .... , 283  The irony is that
Jewell was in the right place at the right time when it came to saving
people's lives in Centennial Olympic Park. Unfortunately, he was in the
wrong place at the wrong time when it came to his libel suit. The appellate
court in Georgia even failed to cite the language in Gertz expressing that
the category of involuntary public figures must be "exceedingly rare. 284
This oversight, coupled with the failure of the court to grapple with the
Gertz language, and its failure to come to terms with or even to consider
the language from the United States Supreme Court's critical decisions in
28528Hutchinson v. Proxmire and Time, Inc. v. Firestone,286 severely
undermined the legitimacy of the opinion. 87  Completely ignoring
Supreme Court precedent without ever making an attempt to distinguish it
or to demonstrate why it was not relevant to the case at bar was not only
lazy, but inexcusable when First Amendment rights were at stake.
282. MITCHELL STEPHENS, BROADCAST NEWS 203 (3d ed. 1993) (on file with author).
283. Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 555 S.E.2d at 186.
284. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345 (emphasis added).
285. 443 U.S. I 11 (1979).
286. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
287. See supra notes 145-57 and accompanying text (discussing these two cases).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Journalists may have a right to be angry at Richard Jewell. After all,
he and his high-profile attorney, L. Lin Wood,2 88 sued numerous media
outlets claiming that their reports allegedly defamed Jewell. 28 9  They
extracted settlements from several of these news entities, including a
reported $500,000 from NBC.29°  Some have suggested that this suit
against NBC was a nuisance, and could not have had much chance of
success had it gone to trial.291
Perhaps other journalists are angry at Jewell because he ultimately did
not fit the story they framed for him-that of a hero-turned-villain, a
criminal hiding behind the fagade of a Southern good o' boy.292 No one is
happy to go down one road at full speed only to find that it dead ends.
Beyond this, many journalists disdain Jewell because they feel that
293they did no more than accurately report the facts of his case. Journalist
Paul Nucci, for instance, recently wrote in Editor & Publisher that the
Atlanta Journal-Constitution "printed accurate information" that Jewell
was, indeed, a suspect according to federal authorities.294 Some journalists
now claim there is a so-called "Jewell Effect" in journalism, a fear that
accurately publishing the name of a suspect who is neither arrested nor
charged with a crime will lead to a slew of defamation lawsuits filed by
that suspect should the person later be cleared of any wrongdoing.295 The
288. Wood was identified by Editor & Publisher in November, 2000 as "among the most
powerful legal foes facing the press today." Jim Moscou, Truth, Justice, and the American Tort,
EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Nov. 27, 2000, at 18. Among Wood's current clients are John and Patsy
Ramsey, who have filed several lawsuits against media outlets on behalf of their son, Burke. Id.
at 21.
289. Jewell reportedly has settled lawsuits against NBC, CNN, the New York Post, and an
Atlanta radio station for a total of more than one million dollars. Edith Stanley, Atlanta Park
Bomb's Blast Still Echoes, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2000, at A5.
290. See Charlie Brennan, Ramseys Retain Libel Lawyer, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Oct.
19, 1999), http://denver.rockymountainnews.com/extra/ramsey/1019rams2.shtml (reporting that
L. Lin Wood "is best known for winning a settlement of more than $500,000 from NBC on behalf
of Richard Jewell").
291. See Mifflin, supra note 52, at A16; Eric Mink, Brokaw Goofed and NBC Paid, DAILY
NEWS (N.Y.), Dec. 11, 1996, at 74, LEXIS, News, News Group File, All ("Chances are, Richard
Jewell ultimately would not have won a libel suit against NBC.").
292. See John Diaz, Jewell Coverage: Excessive Force, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 2, 1996, at A20
(discussing the "story line" that journalists used for Jewell's case and into which "the details
rained like tiny treasures"). See generally JOSEPH N. CAPPELLA & KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON,
SPIRAL OF CYNIcISM: THE PRESS AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 38-57 (Oxford Univ. Press 1997)
(discussing how journalists "frame" news stories).
293. See Paul A. Nucci, 'Allegedly': IHate It, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Jan. 22, 2001, at 62.
294. Id.
295. See Public Rights on Trial, supra note 6 (discussing the "Jewell Effect" as it relates to
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self-censorship that allegedly was created by this fear (i.e., the decision not
to publish names of known suspects) has been described as "the legacy of
Richard Jewell. '296
Unfortunately, the real legacy of Richard Jewell and his case against
the Atlanta Journal-Constitution may have a chilling effect on potential
news sources. This is the result of a ruling that deemed Jewell a limited-
purpose public figure when he agreed to do less than a dozen media
interviews.297 While newspapers fear a "Jewell Effect" that chills the
publishing of suspects' names, they really should fear a chilling effect on
sources who may be more reticent to open up to journalists with what they
know about significant public events.
Consider this hypothetical used by one of the authors of this article in
his Media Law class at Penn State University. You are a volunteer
firefighter, having coffee in the morning at the local coffee shop. You start
to smell smoke and yell fire (not falsely, mind you) 298 as you herd the other
customers out the front door, saving their lives in the process. While
standing outside near the coffee shop as the fire crew puts out the blaze,
you are approached by reporters from local television stations as well as the
local newspapers asking what you might have seen. Although you have
never dealt with the media before or ever been in the media limelight, you
agree to tell them what happened. The journalists, in turn, put your
information on television and in the newspapers, quoting you. A day later,
you do another set of media interviews. Two days after that, those same
television stations and newspapers do to you what they essentially did to
Richard Jewell; they report that you are suspected of arson, that you fit the
profile of someone who wants to be a hero, and that you, somewhat akin to
what the Atlanta Journal-Constitution wrote about Jewell, are a
"wannabe" 299 full-time firefighter. When you sue them for defamation,
they claim you are a public figure.
covering a case of suspected arson in a Seton Hall University dormitory). See generally Brendan
W. Williams, Defamation As a Remedy for Criminal Suspects Tried Only in the Media, 19
COMm. & THE L., Sept. 1997, at 61-65 (providing a very early analysis, using the Richard Jewell
case as an example, of defamation as a legal remedy for individuals named in the media as
suspects of crimes but who are later cleared of wrongdoing).
296. Allan Wolper, Trapped in Jewell Box, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, May 15, 2000, at 13.
297. Atlanta Journal-Constitution v. Jewell, 555 S.E.2d 175 at 183-85 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
298. Cf Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (providing in famous dicta that
"[t]he most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in
a theatre and causing a panic").
299. See Scruggs & Martz, supra note 42, at A12 (The profile of a lone-bomber includes a
police "wannabe.").
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After the appellate court's ruling in Atlanta Journal-Constitution v.
Jewell,300 there is a distinct possibility that you would be held as such. Had
you known this would be the case, and that your defamation action would
be made that much harder by having to prove actual malice instead of
negligence, you might never have talked to the media. Your speech, in
other words, might have been chilled.
The bottom line is that the United States Supreme Court, in its First
Amendment jurisprudence, is decidedly concerned with what Justice
Stephen Breyer recently called the "speech-restricting" consequences of
legal doctrines. 30 1  Any doctrine that would call Richard Jewell either a
voluntary limited-purpose public figure or an involuntary public figure has
the distinct potential to restrict speech. The short-term victory the Atlanta
Journal-Constitution may prove to be a long-term loss for the news media
as a whole if the appellate court's decision stands.
The Supreme Court of Georgia denied that opportunity for change.30 2
On October 23, 2001, Richard Jewell petitioned the high court of Georgia
to consider the twin issues of whether he was either a voluntary limited-
purpose public figure or an involuntary public figure.30 3 In that petition,
Jewell's attorneys laid down the "chilling effect" argument that the authors
of this Article made:
This case ... directly presents the specific question of the
consequences to private individuals who are eyewitnesses to or
participants in a newsworthy event and as a result, are sought
out by the media for print and broadcast interviews. This case
addresses the right of those private individuals to exercise their
First Amendment right of freedom of speech without having the
exercise of that right chilled by the fear that by agreeing to
media requests for interviews, they will be penalized by being
deemed public figures if the media thereafter negligently attacks
their reputations.30 4
Given the Supreme Court of Georgia rejected the opportunity to
consider this issue, the authors of this Article believe that Jewell should
petition the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The
Supreme Court should not only grant certiorari, but should, for the reasons
300. 555 S.E.2d 175 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
301. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 121 S. Ct. 1753, 1766 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(considering a balance between the "speech-restricting and speech-enhancing consequences" of
federal and state wiretap statutes).
302. See generally Petition for Cert., supra note 19.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 10.
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set forth in this Article, adopt the "Good Samaritan Source" rule. This rule
would shield private individuals like Richard Jewell from public figure
status when they do no more than comply with media requests for
comments and answer media-posed questions on issues of public concern.
Both the press and the public will be deprived of information without a rule
that: (1) is premised on the First Amendment grounds that it is speech
enhancing rather than speech restricting;305 (2) informs and enriches the
metaphorical marketplace of ideas;30 6 and (3) strikes a balance between a
private individual's right to speak and a corporate entity's right to defend
itself in the constitutional calculus of libel law. As Jewell's attorneys
argued in a supplemental brief, "a private person who agrees to media
requests for information about matters of public interest does not lose
valuable state protections against defamation unless he participates in the
interviews in an effort to advocate. ,307 Let the "Good Samaritan
Source" rule be the lasting legacy of the long, strange journey of Richard
Jewell from security guard to libel plaintiff.
305. See supra note 300 and accompanying text.
306. The "marketplace of ideas, is perhaps the most powerful metaphor in the free speech
tradition." RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 6 (Alfred A. Knopf 1992).
The marketplace metaphor "consistently dominates the Supreme Court's discussions of freedom
of speech." C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 7 (Oxford University
Press 1989). The metaphor is used frequently today, more than eighty years after it first became a
part of First Amendment jurisprudence with Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.'s
often-quoted admonition that "the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market .. " Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see W. Wat Hopkins, The Supreme Court Defines the
Marketplace ofIdeas, 73 JOURNALISM & MAss COMM. Q. 40 (1996) (providing a fairly recent
review of the Court's use of the marketplace metaphor).
307. Supplemental Brief of Appellant Richard Jewell at 3, Jewell v. Cox Enters., Inc., 555
S.E.2d 175 (Ga. Ct. App., 2001) (No. A01A1565).
